Bad Advice From Agency Travel Representative Costs Employee $838

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services approved an employee’s official travel to Paris, France to attend a medical conference.  Several months prior to his trip, the employee asked his agency travel preparer as to how to go about securing a hotel for the upcoming conference.  By two email messages dated May 5, 2011, the agency travel preparer advised him:

 You can book the room as long as you are going through the housing reservation office connected with the meeting.

 And

 … we will do better cost-wise to make reservations through the organization [the Alzheimer's Association] at what looks like a special rate for attendees. You can do that and send me the information. Use your government credit card.

The agency travel preparer modified her advice the following day, in another email message to the employee, in which she told him that he could not “book just any hotel,” but that it had to be “a meeting-blocked one [by the Conference] or that I have to do it through Omega  [the agency’s travel management center (TMC)].”  In response to a further inquiry from the employee about incurring a cancellation fee, the agency travel preparer advised: “I spoke to the management officer, who said not to worry about it. If we have to cancel your hotel reservation and rebook it, we will reimburse you for the fee.”  Following these instructions, the employee booked his reservation for a “meeting-blocked” room, charging the reservation to his government credit card.

On June 9, 2011, approximately one month before the conference was scheduled to start, the travel preparer informed the employee that she had to make hotel reservations for him through Omega. She stated further that, although she tried to have Omega take over the employee’s reservation, she was unable to keep the hotel reservation he previously booked.  Subsequently, when the employee attempted to cancel his reservation with his previously booked hotel, he was told that the hotel would charge him a cancellation fee equal to 100% of his room rate for the entire five night stay, because the cancellation was after the cutoff date. Ultimately, a cancellation fee was negotiated for 50% of the total, or $838. Thereafter, the employee sought reimbursement from the agency of the reduced $838 cancellation fee. Contrary to earlier assurances, however, his claim was denied by the agency. Consequently, the employee sought review by the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (the “Board”).

Unfortunately for the employee, the Board has repeatedly held that detrimental reliance on erroneous advice from a government official will not confer on a claimant entitlement to recovery, where there is no authority under statute and regulation for the relief being sought. Kristin L. Loer, CBCA 2155-RELO, 11-1 BCA ¶ 34,700; Carl H. Welborn, Jr., CBCA 2151-RELO, 11-1 BCA ¶ 34,650 (2010); Barbara A. Maloney, CBCA 2023-RELO, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,593; Romeo Ayalin, III,CBCA 1533-RELO, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,218. Thus, although the Board found that the employee would not have incurred the cancellation fee in question had it not been for his reliance on clearly erroneous advice provided by the agency’s travel preparer and on her guarantee that any cancellation fee would be reimbursed, the Board held that the agency was correct in denying reimbursement to the employee for the $838 cancellation fee.  In the Matter of Nicholas Kozauer, 112 LRP 1002 (Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, Dec. 20, 2011).

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MSPB Rules that Marginal Performance Fails to Warrant Removal

When an initiating an action for unacceptable performance under 5 U.S.C. § 4303, an agency must demonstrate by substantial evidence that the employee’s performance is unacceptable and that the employee was informed as to what is required to reach better than unacceptable performance, otherwise known as marginal performance.   See Van Prichard v. Dep’t of Defense, 111 LRP 70305 (MSPB Nov. 2011).

Before initiating an action for unacceptable performance under 5 U.S.C. § 4303, an agency must give the employee a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance and must show by substantial evidence that: (1) its action was taken under a performance appraisal system approved by OPM; (2) the employee’s performance standards are valid; and (3) the employee’s performance was unacceptable in at least one of his critical elements.  See Van Prichard v. Dep’t of Defense, supra, citing Diprizio v. Dep’t of Transportation, 88 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 7 (2011); 5 C.F.R. § 432.104.  In Van Prichard v. Dep’t of Defense, the MSPB clarified that unacceptable performance must in fact be unacceptable, and that, although not ideal, an employee cannot be removed for performance-based reasons if he maintained marginal performance.  In Van Prichard v. Dep’t of Defense, the agency removed the employee even though he had maintained marginal performance and despite the fact that the agency had not informed him what he needed to do to maintain or achieve marginal performance.  Rather, the agency only told him what he needed to do to achieve fully successful performance.  Because the agency did not set forth the minimum level of performance to achieve to avoid removal (i.e., marginal performance), the agency’s performance standards were not valid and the MSPB could not consider the employee’s performance deficiencies.  Accordingly, the MSPB ordered the employee’s reinstatement.

Van Prichard v. Dep’t of Defense, shows that all may not be lost if you are presented with a performance-based removal and that a second look at your agency’s performance standards may be worth your while.

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When It Comes To Your Security Clearance, Sometimes You Can’t Go Home

As the year ends, your thoughts naturally go to spending time with family and friends. Going home, even if just for a short visit, may become one of your 2012 resolutions.  But going home may have real consequences when it comes to your access to national security information.

Recent decisions from the Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), demonstrate that going home may not be an option for you if you wish to access or maintain access to national security information.  Let’s first look at a case where DOHA granted the applicant’s request for a security clearance.  In the Matter of Applicant for Security Clearance ISCR Case No. 10-07319 (Dec. 9, 2011), the DOHA Administrative Judge granted the applicant’s access to classified information where the applicant was born in Iran but had come to the United States at age 15 or 16, had settled in the Mid-West, where she attended college, and held all of her assets in the United States.  The applicant had, however, renewed her Iranian passport in 2009, prior to her current defense contractor employment, in order to attend her sister’s wedding in Iran; thereby causing, in part, the security concern.  The Administrative Judge noted that Iran “is possibly the most serious threat to the US…sponsors terrorism…[and that] Iran’s security forces often target family members of political prisoners for harassment purposes.”  However, as the Administrative Judge also noted in finding that the applicant had mitigated the security concern, the applicant’s sister did not actually reside in Iran but resided in Australia, her brother resides in the United States, and only the applicant’s two aunts and a cousin reside in Iran.  The Administrative Judge also considered that the applicant had not travelled to Iran since her sister’s wedding and has no intention of doing so, the applicant does not consider herself a dual citizen with Iran, the applicant had surrendered her Iranian passport to her Facility Security Officer (FSO), the applicant had the unqualified support of friends and colleagues and the applicant further had minimal contact with her Iranian relatives.  Accordingly, her access was granted.

Now let’s look at a case where DOHA’s Administrative Judge did not grant the applicants’ access to classified information.  In the matter of Applicant for Security Clearance, ISCR Case No. 11-00561 (Dec. 12, 2011), the applicant was a native of India and a United States citizen, his wife was also a native of India and a United States citizen, their children were United States citizens, and the applicant had supplied reference letters from coworkers who had cited his access to “confidential budgetary, financial and personnel information ‘and had showed the utmost care in safeguarding this information and in being fully compliant with the [agency’s] information security guidelines.” The applicant, however, also maintained weekly contact with his parents who live in India, and noted in his responses to DOHA that, as one of three children, he had an obligation to care for his parents. Further, he maintained monthly contact with those siblings in India and with various in-laws, maintained three bank accounts in India and owned property in India, and held an Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card granting him certain rights in India.  Finally, he irregularly visited India and intended to one day “go back to” India.  The Administrative Judge considered these ongoing ties with India in addition to recent outbreaks of violence and terrorism in India, illegal export of U.S. restricted, dual-use technology to India and the targeting in India of “unclassified and classified information in a range of sectors,” to ultimately deny the applicant’s access to classified information.

So what do these two different outcomes show?  First, you can go home again.  But, second, if you go home, be prepared to have your access to classified information revisited.  Be further prepared that if you also maintain regular contact with close or immediate family members in your native country, if you maintain assets in your home country, such as bank accounts or property, and if that home country also sponsors or is afflicted by terrorism, you may not be able to access classified information.

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All of the Tenderness of a Seasick Crocodile.

No. It’s not Mr. Grinch.  It’s the EEOC.  That’s right, even if you successfully prove that you have been discriminated against, harassed or retaliated against, the likelihood of truly being compensated for that unlawful discrimination, harassment or retaliation is increasingly unlikely.  Last year we told you about McCorvey v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 0120100908 (Oct. 1, 2010), an EEOC complaint where the Commission found that the Agency had retaliated against the Complainant but failed to award the Complainant compensatory damages. The Commission’s Grinch-like ways have not gotten better in 2011.

For example, in Parsanian v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120093702 (Jan. 7, 2011), the Commission awarded the Complainant only $1,625 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages after it found that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her disability.  The Commission considered that the Complainant did not socialize as much, she was unhappy, and that she was always crying as a result of the discrimination. The Commission reduced the award by 75% from the $6,500 awarded to the Complainant by the Administrative Judge because her emotional distress was not only caused by the discrimination.

In Mazurek v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0720100044 (April 4, 2011), the Commission awarded the Complainant only $2,000 in nonpecuniary damages where he proved his complaint that he had been non-selected due to his sex.  The Commission awarded only $2,000 even though the Complainant showed that he had suffered work-related stress, was inconvenienced in his family life, and could not spend as much time with his family, including his two young children.

The Commission also only awarded in $2,000 in non-pecuniary damages where the Complainant proved his reprisal case.  See Santiago v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0720100038 (Mar. 2, 2011).  In Santiago v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, the Commission based its award on the “general” nature of the Complainant’s claim for damages.  The Commission’s basis for the limited award is somewhat perplexing in that the Complainant not only claimed he had anxiety attacks, profuse sweating, headaches, and pain in his arm, but had his therapist testify as to his significant stress and anxiety.  The Complainant also testified that he went to the hospital with heart attack symptoms, and that he had difficulty sleeping, which affected his relationship with his family. Nevertheless, the Commission found that his testimony alone was not enough to attribute his pain and suffering to his discrimination.

The Commission’s propensity to awarding only limited compensatory damages was further demonstrated in Thompson v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120100682 (Oct. 21, 2011). There the Complainant requested $40,000 in compensatory damages.  The Postal Service did not contest that the harm that the Complainant suffered was a direct result of unlawful retaliation.  The Complainant could further show that the unlawful retaliation occurred over a period of five months, that he had to see his primary care physician because he was experiencing a rapid heart beat, elevated blood pressure and dizziness.  His primary care physician then referred him to a psychiatrist who diagnosed him as having an adjustment disorder with mixed features, including anxiety and depression as well as occupational problems.  Indeed, Complainant was frustrated, depressed and lacked energy and motivation.  His psychiatrist testified that he reported feeling harassed at work and had begun to isolate himself, did not want to leave home, had insomnia, and was worried, anxious and ruminated.  He was prescribed Wellbutrin and Prozac to treat the depression.  Considering the Complainant’s request for damages and his psychiatrist’s testimony, you may think that a request for $40,000 in compensatory damages is reasonable.  But the Commission would and did disagree.  The Commission upheld the Administrative Judge’s award of only $15,000.  In so finding, the Commission considered the severity of the harm suffered, the length of time that Complainant suffered harm and the Commission precedent.  As we have reported previously, Commission precedent favors small awards, thus the Commission’s reliance on that precedent to whittle down the award is not surprising.  However, it does seem Grinch-like on the part of the Commission to state that the severity of harm here did not warrant a higher award.

In summary, 2011 was another year of limited compensatory damages awards for Complainants.  Perhaps 2012 will bring a change?

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EEOC Confirms that Administrative Investigations Can Constitute Retaliation

Time and time again employees file an EEO complaint only to be subjected to an administrative investigation a few weeks later on false allegations of absence without leave (AWOL), time and attendance fraud, or other false allegations.  Often, after the complainant attempts to amend his complaint to include that administrative investigation as an example of reprisal, the agency will refuse to process that amendment, arguing that the investigation was not an adverse action, that the investigation did not amount to unlawful harassment or that it simply “had” to conduct an investigation based upon allegations it received.  Although these administrative investigations may not result in discipline, the investigations damage the employee’s reputation and cause the employee additional stress.  Moreover, the investigations dissuade the employee from further exercising his EEO complaint rights.  As such, the EEOC recently confirmed that such investigations are in fact a form of unlawful reprisal. Myers v. Dep’t of Justice, 111 LRP 67961 (Oct. 13, 2011).

In Myers, the complainant was subjected to an AWOL investigation after engaging in protected EEO activity.  She was not, however, ultimately charged with AWOL. Nevertheless, the EEOC found that the investigation itself “carried with it the prospect of obstructing Complainant’s career” and that it was sufficient to deter her or others from engaging in the EEO process.  Accordingly, the EEOC found that the complainant was subjected to discrimination based on reprisal.  Following Myers, it should be clear to agencies that complaints of discrimination based on reprisal involving administrative investigations are claims upon which relief could be granted and that those claims should be accepted for investigation.

Finally, after the EEOC’s decision in Myers and because of the recent U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia finding in McKeithan v. Government Printing Office, 111 LRP 55373 (D.D.C. 2011), if your agency dismisses a claim of reprisal related to an administrative investigation, you should request that the agency reconsider that dismissal, otherwise you may waive your right to redress on the harm caused by that investigation.    As we reported in September, in McKeithan, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found the employee abandoned his claims of discrimination when he failed to object to the GPO’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity framing of his complaint.  In other words, the GPO dismissed and failed to investigate some of the complainant’s claims, but because the complainant did not respond to that dismissal, he missed out on further pursuing those claims.

For more information,  contact the Jeffrey Law Group, PLLC, The Federal Employee’s Law Firm®,  at 202.312.7100.

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MSPB to Launch Pilot Program Mandating e-filing

Effective January 11, 2012, the MSPB will require agencies and appellants’ attorneys in MSPB proceedings before the Washington Regional Office (WRO) and Denver Field Office (DEFO) to file all pleadings electronically (e-filed).  This requirement will apply to all pleadings except those containing classified information or Sensitive Security Information (SSI).  Further, while the new rule will allow agencies or appellants’ attorneys to request an exemption from the administrative judge for a specific appeal and/or pleading, the administrative judge may only grant such exemption in unusual circumstances and only to pleadings that include scanned material (i.e., not documents prepared and saved in a word processing program).  See 76 FR 63,537-38 (Oct. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(p)).

For more information,  contact the Jeffrey Law Group, PLLC, The Federal Employee’s Law Firm®,  at 202.312.7100.

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Do Not Rely Upon Opposing Counsel to Tell You When to Appear for Your EEOC Hearing

In our last blog post, we discussed the EEOC’s finding on the merits in Smith-Riggins v. USPS, Appeal No. 0120093837 (Aug. 31, 2011).  In this blog post, we discuss the EEOC’s discussion of whether Smith-Riggins’ reliance on the Agency to tell her when to appear for her EEOC hearing was reasonable.  In short, the EEOC found that her reliance was not reasonable.

The EEOC Administrative Judge scheduled Smith-Riggins’ hearing for 8:30 a.m. on April 15, 2009.  After the Complainant did not appear, the Administrative Judge dismissed the hearing request and remanded the complaint to the Agency.  The Complainant argued on appeal that she did not appear to the hearing because the Agency’s attorney told her the wrong start time.  She asserted that at the pre-hearing conference the Agency was tasked with scheduling the place and time for the hearing, and that thereafter the Agency’s attorney informed her that the hearing would begin at 10:30 a.m. and be held at the Agency.  Thus, the Complainant argued that the Administrative Judge should have excused her for not appearing at the hearing and rescheduled the hearing for another time.

Whereas the Agency’s attorney may have misinformed the Complainant, the EEOC considered that the Administrative Judge had issued a revised scheduling order setting the time of the hearing for 8:30 a.m., that the Agency’s attorney submitted a declaration denying that he misinformed the Complainant, and that the Complainant’s start time at work the day of the hearing was scheduled for 8:30 a.m., rather than a later start time, thereby indicating that the Complainant was to be at work for the hearing’s – which was scheduled to take place at work – 8:30 a.m. start time.  The EEOC found that the Administrative Judge’s revised scheduling order and the Complainant’s earlier start time were enough notice to the Complainant that her hearing was scheduled for 8:30 a.m.  The EEOC did not explicitly state that it also credited the Agency attorney’s declaration that he had not misinformed the Complainant over the Complainant’s assertion that the Agency’s attorney had provided the incorrect time.  However, considering that on its decision on the merits of the Complainant’s complaint the EEOC stressed the importance of corroborating evidence, it is very much possible that the EEOC simply did not have enough corroborating evidence to credit the Complainant’s assertion over the Agency attorney’s declaration.

The lesson to be learned from the dismissal of Smith-Riggins’ hearing request is to not rely upon the oral assertions of opposing counsel, but to be sure to review all of the mail that you receive from the EEOC, especially the Administrative Judge.

For more information,  contact the Jeffrey Law Group, PLLC, The Federal Employee’s Law Firm®,  at 202.312.7100.

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Pushing Employee Warrants a Hostile Work Environment Finding but Using the “N word” Does Not

Last month we reported that an EEOC Administrative Judge found that an employee’s involuntary baptism was not conduct that constituted hostile work environment harassment. Nikita Cloyd v. Dep’t of Agriculture, Appeal No. 0120101052 (Aug. 26, 2011).  The EEOC’s finding in Cloyd left many wondering just what conduct the EEOC does find to be severe enough to justify a finding of hostile work environment harassment.  In Smith-Riggins v. USPS, Appeal No. 0120093837 (Aug. 31, 2011), the EEOC partially answered that question.

In Smith-Riggins, the EEOC found that the Complainant’s Postmaster engaged in unwelcome verbal and physical conduct based on Complainant’s sex when in March 2007 the Postmaster pointed to a magazine with a woman wearing a tiger-print bikini and told Complainant, “This looks like something you would wear;” and when in September 2007 the Postmaster called Complainant to a room with three other female employees present, directed the Complainant to turn around, pointed to the Complainant’s buttocks, stated, “Look ya’ll, [Complainant] is wearing lace underwear,” then pushed the Complainant, causing the Complainant to cry out in pain.  The EEOC stressed that the above-referenced events occurred in front of others and included physical contact, that all of the witnesses who testified during the Agency’s investigation agreed that the Postmaster engaged in physical conduct that, whether a shove in the back or a push in the shoulder, caused Complainant noticeable physical pain to the point that the Postmaster apologized and that the Complainant cried out in pain.  The EEOC went on to find that the Postmaster’s remarks on bikinis and lace underwear, coupled with pushing the Complainant, constituted unusually severe conduct thereby establishing a hostile work environment claim.

Notably, the EEOC analyzed the Smith-Riggins claim as one of a single incident of severe conduct.  However, although the EEOC states that this case is about a single incident sufficient to create an abusive environment, the EEOC does not in fact rely upon only the single incident of pushing the Complainant. The EEOC combines that incident with an earlier March incident to support its finding.  By so combining the facts to support its finding, the question becomes whether pushing the Complainant alone would have been enough to satisfy the EEOC that a sufficiently severe incident occurred.  Unfortunately, the EEOC has failed to answer that question in this case.

This case is also interesting in that the EEOC did not find that the Postmaster yelling “ you n-gger” to a white male employee or a coworker telling the Complainant that she was “getting uppity” were examples of harassment based upon race.  The EEOC reasoned that it needed evidence from someone other than the Complainant – in other words, witnesses – to corroborate the Complainant’s claims regarding those slurs.  The Complainant’s testimony, standing alone, was not enough for the EEOC.

For more information,  contact the Jeffrey Law Group, PLLC, The Federal Employee’s Law Firm®,  at 202.312.7100.

 

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Employee’s Personal Biases not Enough to State an EEO Claim

Coworkers’ celebration of employee’s same-sex marriage is not unlawful harassment, according to the EEOC.  In Walker v. Environmental Protection Agency, Appeal No. 0120112853 (Oct. 6, 2011), the EEOC found that emails announcing and celebrating one employee’s same-sex marriage did not constitute unlawful harassment of another employee and upheld the underlying decision dismissing the complaint.

The Complainant worked at the EPA’s National Center for Environmental Assessment (NCEA).  He filed his formal EEO complaint after NCEA’s Acting Director sent the following email to all NCEA employees: “[Employee A] and his partner [named] are getting married this Sunday.  The IO is sponsoring an informal celebration to congratulate [Employee A] on this happy event.  Please feel free to drop by the IO conference room . . . to wish them well.” The Complainant responded to that email by replying to all recipients and stating that he felt the announcement was “offensive and insensitive to my religious faith as a Christian.”  The next day, NCEA employees sent 15-20 emails to all recipients congratulating Employee A.  Additionally, two employees directly emailed the Complainant, expressing their opinion that the Complainant’s email was insensitive because he sent it to all employees.  The Complainant then filed a formal EEO complaint alleging that he was subjected to harassment and reprisal on the basis of his religious beliefs (Pentecostal).

The EEOC upheld the underlying decision dismissing the complaint, finding that the Complainant’s claim of harassment did not allege conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Complainant’s employment.  The EEOC reasoned that the Complainant was not singled out in the receiving the announcement email, the gathering was voluntary, the email comported with the Agency’s long standing practice of celebrating milestone events in the lives of employees, and the announcement email was a one-time occurrence that could not be considered sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a viable hostile work environment claim.  The EEOC also considered that although the 15-20 emails congratulating Employee A were probably in response to the Complainant’s email, none of them challenged Complainant’s religious beliefs or singled him out.  Likewise, the two emails sent directly to the Complainant were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a viable hostile work claim.  Accordingly, the claim was properly dismissed.

For more information,  contact the Jeffrey Law Group, PLLC, The Federal Employee’s Law Firm®,  at 202.312.7100.

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Taking you to the Water – Even if you don’t want to go

The EEOC recently upheld an Administrative Judge’s decision issuing summary judgment to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) where an employee baptized her coworker, the Complainant, without the Complainant’s consent.  Nikita Cloyd v. Dep’t of Agriculture, Appeal No. 0120101052 (Aug. 26, 2011). Notable in this decision is that the Commission did not seem especially sold on the argument that the baptism amounted to a hostile work environment, and, even if it did, the Agency overcame liability for the unwelcome baptism by a series of corrective actions.

In Cloyd v. Dep’t of Agriculture, the Complainant alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment on the bases of race (African American), religion (Rastafarian) and in reprisal for her prior EEO activity when her coworker poured water onto the Complainant’s hair, stating, “I am baptizing you.”  Immediately following that incident, the Complainant reported the baptism to her Director who said that the Complainant and the coworker offended each other, should apologize, and should cool off over night.   In response, the Complainant contacted the Agency EEO office and the Federal Protective Service, alleging workplace violence.

Subsequent to the Complainant reporting the unwelcome baptism, the Director met with the Complainant and the coworker together.  During that meeting, the Director stressed that workplace violence should not be tolerated and asserted that he affirmed the Agency’s no tolerance position on workplace violence.

Thereafter, the Complainant further reported the baptism to the Executive Resources Staff Director (ERSD), who informed the Complainant’s coworker that disciplinary action was pending, that the coworker would no longer be in the rotation to serve as Acting Branch Chief, and that the coworker should avoid contact with the Complainant.  The ERSD then issued a Proposal to Suspend the coworker for five days.  The coworker never reported to work again following receipt of the proposed suspension, having accepted a position with another Federal agency.  When the coworker’s new employer contacted the ERSD, the ERSD explained the entire situation, including the proposed suspension.

The Commission did not dispute the Administrative Judge’s finding that the circumstances surrounding the baptism did not rise to the level of harassment or the Administrative Judge’s reasoning that the baptism was a isolated incident not of the type of severe or pervasive conduct that creates an unreasonable interference with the Complainant’s work environment.  The Commission then implicitly adopted the Administrative Judge’s finding that even if the baptism amounted to a hostile work environment, the Agency took appropriate and quick action to ensure no incidents occurred in the future.

It has been long established that a single isolated incident of misconduct by one coworker against another may not constitute hostile work environment harassment.  What Cloyd shows us is that even when that single isolated incident goes to such a fundamental act as baptism, the Commission still may not side with the Complainant.

For more information,  contact the Jeffrey Law Group, PLLC, The Federal Employee’s Law Firm®,  at 202.312.7100.

 

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The information contained in this blog is of a general nature and is subject to change; it is not meant to serve as legal advice in any particular situation.   The law is in a constant state of change as Congress amends or passes new statutes, Federal agencies issue new regulations, and courts issue new interpretations of the law. The Jeffrey Law Group, PLLC, does not guarantee the accuracy of the information in this blog post.
For information regarding your specific needs, please contact the Jeffrey Law Group, PLLC., at 202.312.7100.